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Decline and Rise of Clusters? 





The notorious remark by Mark Twain (1897) that “the report 
of my death was an exaggeration” may also be applied to the recently 
revived and intensified debate about the usefulness of the cluster 
concept. This debate first focussed on and critizised several main 
points of a predominantly Porterian but also somewhat outdated 
“Italian” industrial district version of economic agglomeration. Yet at 
the same time these criticisms imply that additional elements may 
give rise to a differentiated concept of clusters and of the analysis of 
the conditions under which geographically condensed forms of 
cooperations between firms, public and semipublic institutions and 
research organizations may lead to a broader understanding of 
regional innovation processes. 
The main points of critique towards the Porterian model but 
also towards too vague concepts of clusters can be outlined by by the 
following quotations: 
• According to Martin/Sunley (2003, 29) the “siren of universalism” 
pulls the cluster concept into shallow water, its heterogeneity and 
lack of causality and determination makes it overly stretched, 
thin and fractured. Major weaknesses of the Porterian model are 
the neglected issue of geographical scale (“stretching alarmingly 
from the local to the national and back again with bewildering 
facility”), the famous “fallacy of composition” where specific case 
studies are taken to represent some general conditions, the static 
character, the selling of the concept as a policy panacea. 
• Another – indirect – critical assessment of interpretations of 
economic networks is given by Zuckerman (2003, 545) who “(i)n 
the face of such cacophony” (i.e. wide variations in subject matter 
and analytical style concerning economic networks) suggests 
three conceptions: networks as concentrated exchange, as 
primordial affiliations, and as structures of mutual orientation. 
Each of them has a different emphasis: the first interprets the 
ties as market exchanges (albeit more concentrated than is 
expected by orthodox market models), the second regards 
economic interactions shaped in consequential ways by ascribed 
relationships (and hence insists that market interaction could not 
be understood without attention to the social relationship), the 
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third emphasizes the specific and different ties leading to 
“sociometric” networks.Yet all the interpretations have to grapple 
with some basic questions: can it be established that the 
structure of the networks has causal implications for the agents 
of interest, how strong is or can self-interest be in such networks, 
how much choice is involved in the selection of ties, is there a 
fitting theory of the firm that might explicate the pattern of 
relation, how passive (or necessarily active) are the network 
links? 
• In a similar vein Maskell and Kebir (2005) point to a lack of 
conceptual clarity and – very outspoken – to “the risk that the 
cluster concept will join those rare terms of public discourse that 
have gone directly from obscurity to meaninglessness without 
any intervening period of coherence” (p. 2). They nevertheless 
admit that the cluster phenomenon has attracted increasing 
attention. As necessary elements of  a “qualified” cluster theory 
they quote the questions of ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘why’ and usually also of 
‘when/where/who’. 
• Not so much a lack of conception, but its plurality is another 
point of criticism: ideas from quite different conceptual 
approaches – sometimes complementary, sometimes 
contradictory – are included in the discussion of (industrial) 
clustering (Gordon/McCann 2000, 2005). Yet – despite having 
different approaches – the cluster concept is sometimes reduced 
to an idealized typology of an industrial cluster with specific 
behaviour involving many small firms benefiting from flexible 
inter-firm alliances, supported by mutual information exchanges 
of both an informal and formal nature. This leads to the question 
– from the point of view of innovation theory – why this type of 
cluster should be regarded as superior to other kinds of 
arrangements and relationship between geography and industrial 
organization. This opens the perpective for different hypotheses 
about the geography of innovation. 
Despite these criticisms there is a common understanding – 
also among the above mentioned authors – that clusters are a still 
widely researched and equally widely used concept for regional and 
innovation policy. Implicit in this respect for an albeit vague concept 
is the conviction – and this is the starting point for this paper – that 
it serves as a unifying approach for important elements for the 
changing character of the innovation process: 
• New forms of evolutionary economic behaviour enter the 
interpretative framework of economics emphasising the role of 
interaction and coordination processes in the economy that are 
beyond the individual maximising concept and marked by 
bounded rationality (Nelson / Winter 1982; Simon 1991; for a 
recent overview see Foster and Metcalfe 2001). Vast recent 
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research points at networking capabilities as a key factor to 
innovate and at the fact that the core of innovative capacity 
resides in the capacity of efficiently combining different pieces of 
knowledge by various agents and agencies (for a compilation see 
Ronde/Hussler 2005). Innovation has to be regarded as an 
evolutionary and social process of collective learning. 
• The regional dimension gains new importance especially for the 
exchange of knowledge and for learning processes; here the focus 
is on the necessity and forms of proximity for knowledge 
exchange (Rallet and Torre 1998), on the specific character of 
knowledge and its aspect of regional governance (Gertler 1997, 
2001; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). This does not only lead to a 
general and diverse regionalization of innovation policy 
(Fritsch/Stephan 2005) but furthermore to ‘regional knowledge 
capabilities’ that help metamorphose macro-processes through 
ground-up globalization (Cooke 2005). 
• A third element is the necessity of guiding and coordinating 
institutions for these new forms of behaviour on a regional level. 
Interactions need institutions (such as markets). Yet if the focus 
is on learning and knowledge sharing markets alone will not 
suffice for these forms of interaction and additional institutions 
will be needed. The problem then consists of finding and 
constructing institutions that reduce and metabolise complexity 
through a dynamic process of distributed learning (Rullani 2002) 
with the open question if it is possible to get from specific 
industrial cases to a general economic model (Curzio/Fortis 
2002). 
Clusters and their networks combine these three elements. In 
chapter 3 an evolutionary and instutitional framework will be 
outlined for an interpretation of clusters that includes these 
elements: clusters will be interpreted as a useful concept for an 
anaylsis of factors moulding economic performance in the sense of 
supporting the diffusion of knowledge within a regional context. 
Chapter 2 will give before a short outline of changing perspectives in 
the interpretation and legitimization of clusters. Chapter 4 will point 
to new directions of research from these perspectives. 
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2. From agglomeration to organizational learning and 
knowledge exchange 
 
The emphasis of cluster analysis has certainly changed in 
recent years. The original concentration on clusters as “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, 
service providers, firms in related industries and associated 
institutions in a particular field that compete but also cooperate” 
(Porter 1990 and 2000) was extended to the specific forms but also 
limits of cooperation. The recent renaissance of interest has focussed 
more on clusters and networks as an institution for knowledge 
management and organizational learning emphasizing the organic-
evolutionary dimension. Growth of the knowledge base depends on 
intended and unintended individual processing of experiences, i.e. 
‘learning’, while the interpretation, transfer and use of experiences is 
influenced by interaction between individuals and between 
organizations (Cohen/Levinthal 1989, Anderson 1995, Hartmann 
2004). 
In fact, this was already outlined by Alfred Marshall 
(1890/1920): Economic success of firms depends of an increasing 
specialization and of the development of a more efficient organization 
of industrial production relying on material linkages, technological 
spill-overs and labour market pooling effects. Yet besides this well-
known triple of reasons for agglomerative tendencies and their 
benefits Marshall offers many more insights for a dynamic 
interpretation of clusters. The new element of Marshalls idea lay in 
the dynamic complementarity of this system of interdependent 
economic units: Up to then efficiency raising specialization rested 
either on scale effects of the single production units or on external 
comparative advantages. Marshall thus points to the organic-
evolutionary character of independent decision making units, i.e. 
these effects exist also without a hierarchical command or control 
structure. Loasby (1998, p.70) therefore emphasizes Marshall’s ideas 
as a theory of economic development, as an early “evolutionary” 
theory where the “principle of differentiation (is) combined with 
integration”: Forms of organization should not only be judged by 
their implications for allocative efficiency, but primarily by their 
effectiveness in aiding the growth and use of knowledge (Marshall, 
1920, 138). In addition to this differentiation between allocative and 
creative functions of the market which are of specific concern for a 
dynamic interpretation of regional development (Steiner 1990) 
Marshall further develops A. Smith’s idea of specialisation insofar as 
he outlines the importance of the generation of variety within each 
specialism and – furthermore – the existence of two kinds of 
variations: between and within specialisms. This opens the view for 
interpreting clusters as not only competing against each other but as 
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producing variety also within each cluster. This leads Loasby in his 
interpretation of Marshall to view clusters as a “scientific 
community” with both the task of restoring tranquility and of 
“devising intimate connections which exploit the advantages of the 
increasing subdivision of functions within the economy” (p.78).  
The focus on learning and knowledge creation as a special 
aspect of the cluster debate was revived by the experience of petrified 
clusters in the former old industrial areas in the 1980s (Steiner 
1990,Tichy 1998, 2001): the importance of learning within clusters 
was emphasized by the fact that cluster petrification is a major risk 
in practice, and that such petrification arises when lack of knowledge 
acquisition and learning leads to insufficient performance. The 
underlying hypothesis of a regional cycle – in analogy to the product 
cycle hypothesis – has as a main argument that lock-ins of 
technological and/or political nature act as barriers to innovation 
and prevent the adequate renewal of skills (Tödtling/Trippl 2005). 
In the middle of the 1990s concepts of learning therefore were 
integrated in theories of regional development and cluster analysis: 
the “learning region” (Florida 1995, Asheim 1996, Morgan 1997) 
interpreted the region as a focal point of a general “learning 
economy”. The challenge in respect to clusters was the fact that they 
were regarded up to then as capable only (and at best) for 
incremental innovations. Yet this is not sufficient in face of the new 
economic situation and its logic: “The challenge of ‘learning regions’ 
is to increase the innovative capability of SME-based industrial 
agglomerations through the economic logic by which milieu foster 
innovation.” (Storper 1995, 203) But this meant an additional quality 
of interaction within regional clusters in their emphasis on horizontal 
cooperation and deliberate interactive processes of developing new 
perspectives: “Such ‘learning regions’ would be in a much better 
position than ‘traditional’ industrial districts to avoid a ‘lock-in’ of 
development caused by localized path-dependency” (Asheim 1996, 
395). 
Yet in this concept the description of the necessary contents 
and the detailed processes of learning activities remained rather 
schematic and unspecific. So it was a necessary first step in 
emphasizing the need for entrepreneurial learning, innovation and 
spatial proximity but with rather vague definitions and a lack of 
empirical foundations (Hassink 1997). 
A further step was the perspective of “interactive learning” 
referring to the basic ideas of Lundvall (1988, 1992) in connection 
with the regional dimensions of innovation systems yet because of its 
spatial dimension also interpreted in terms of clusters (Morgan 1997, 
Antonelli and Quèrè 2002). Learning here is conceived “as a set of 
activities in which all kinds of knowledge are (re-)combined to form 
something new “(Meeus et al. 1999, 5). The notion of interaction 
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necessary for learning has two dimensions: on the one side it 
describes the structure of interaction, on the other side the way of 
interaction between the various partners: “… the overall innovation 
performance depends not only how specific organizations like firms 
and research institutions perform, but how they interact with each 
other and with the government sector in knowledge production and 
distribution. Innovating firms operate within a common institutional 
set-up, and they jointly depend on, contribute to and utilize a 
common infrastructure” (Gregersen/Johnson 1997, 483). Connected 
with this “interactive learning” approach was the insight that 
learning cannot be reduced to acts of transaction and hence surpass 
the realm of transaction cost analysis – the establishment of 
economic competence at the level of an organization and in networks 
of organizations is an interactive process calling for a different 
analytical perspective (Lundvall 2002, 28). Learning accordingly 
turns into an interorganizational cooperation and communication 
process at the supra-firm level with an automatic recombination of 
knowledge leading – more or less automatically – to increased 
innovation. 
Collective learning centres on the development of a regional 
knowledge base (Camagni 1991, Lorenz 1992, Lorenz and Lazaric 
1998, Keeble and Wilkinson 1999), is closely connected with 
interactive learning yet more focussed on industrial districts and 
clusters: “… regional collective learning involves the creation and 
further development of a base of common or shared knowledge 
among individuals making up a productive system which allows 
them to coordinate their actions in the resolution of the technological 
and organizational problems they confront” (Lorenz 1996, 18). 
Central for the emergence of collective learning is the existence of a 
cluster with organizational, institutional and social proximity of all 
participants (Lawson 1997). Learning here becomes a positive 
dynamic externality, the regional knowledge base gets the character 
of a public good: “In this way, the creative knowledge accumulates 
outside the firm, and becomes a club good: no rivalry exists for its 
use by agents belonging to the club, and external agents are barred 
from access” (Capello 1999, 357). This club-like character of the 
networks proposes a stronger territorial focus: territoriality 
guarantees the opportunity for frequent contact, but it also permits 
and supports the existence of a common language and code of 
understanding.  
Further steps centered on specific elements of the 
development of the (mostly regional) knowledge base and their 
interactions asking for the units of operation that interact when a 
system of information is formed. So the “Triple Helix as an analytical 
model (of innovation) adds to the description of the variety of 
institutional arrangements and policy models an explanation of their 
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dynamics” (Etzkowitz/Leydesdorff 2000, 112). Here the specific 
interaction between university-industry-government is considered to 
undergo observable reorganizations in their relation. This relations 
create specific knowledge spaces with different types of networking 
which form the basis for interactive or spiral experiences (Casas et 
al, 2000). This approach was critized for “emphasizing the consensus 
aspects of relations among such distinctive ‘epistemic communities’” 
(Cooke 2005, 1129); it is inadequately contextuated and overlooks 
the asymmetric knowledge problems – it is a weakness of most 
universities to act as knowledge transceivers. This led to ask for 
methods of managing knowledge, including also intangible assets, of 
regional networks. Originally developed to report the contribution of 
human competences, knowledge and skill’s to a company’s value 
(Grasenick/Ploder 2002) there have been also attempts to raise it to 
the level of clusters from a perspective of organizational learning 
including structural capital (such as organizational routines, data 
bases, procedures) and relational capital (cooperation with political 
decision makers and other networks). The basic intention is to 
develop methods for monitoring also the intangible assets of regional 
networks (Dösinger et al. 2003).  
These recent developments in the interpretation and analysis 
shifted the emphasis from material links to immaterial knowledge 
flows within clusters and pointed to the need for connectivity 
between the different agents for knowledge creation and diffusion. 
This then leads to further questions concerning to what degree 
clusters are to be regarded as non-market devices by which firms 
seek to coordinate their activities with other firms and knowledge-
generating institutions. Ongoing learning processes between firms 
and within clusters stress the importance of institutional 
arrangements for the generation of knowledge and learning networks 
which are not available in the markets (Maskell/Malmberg, 1999).  
All these aspects and perspectives of the function clusters can 
fulfil emphasize the need of an institutional embeddedness of 
technological opportunities, routines, diverse forms of market 
interaction and selection processes. This leads to further reflections 
on the evolutionary character of those institutions who coordinate 
the mechanisms necessary for and leading to sustained processes of 
innovation and change. 
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3. Evolutionary and institutional elements of clusters 
 
Looking from the perspective of evolutionary and institutional 
analysis at clusters yields additional insights into their specific 
character and their usefulness for the development of technology and 
support for innovation. The recent renaissance of interest in 
institutions as a factor shaping economic performance has 
implications also for the creation and sustained existence of clusters 
as a tool for knowledge management and as learning organizations 
within and across regions. Knowledge creation and technology 
management is not an automatic outcome of individually rational 
behaviour but needs guiding institutions such as clusters and 
networks. Several general ideas of institutional economics (be they 
“old” or “new”) seem to be of relevance and help to underline the 
institutional character of clusters in the process of technological 
development. 
 
3.1. Clusters as social technologies 
 
The very basic idea of institutionalism underlines the fact 
that individual behaviour is the effect of social institutions moulding 
behaviour and that voluntary interactions are in need of shared 
institutions. Loasby (2003, 102) accordingly defines institutions as 
“(relatively) stable frameworks for decisions and action: intentional 
action is the result of cognitive processes which require an 
institutional basis that is not simultaneously open to revision”. 
Influenced by institutions intentional action turns into routines and 
habit-formation. This habit-formation becomes the more important 
the more cooperation - instead of competition – is needed: Innovation 
and productivity gains are based on subtle forms of cooperation, 
where the creation of new knowledge implies an intense process of 
interaction which cannot be explained solely out of individual 
decision making. This is of additional importance if we interpret – as 
formulated as one of three possible interpretations by Zuckerman 
(2003, 550) - economic networks as “economic interactions that are 
shaped in consequential ways by ascribed or ‘primordial’ 
relationships where habits are influenced by institutions that pre-
exist the market”. 
Institutions matter specifically when we deal with innovation 
and its essential characteristics of uncertainty and knowledge 
sharing. Innovation processes in developed economies have 
essentially been marked by differing forms of innovative milieus and 
their supporting institutions. Evolutionary economics – as a special 
interpretation of the institutional perspective – sees these 
institutions as a moulding device for the technologies used by a 
society. Loasby (2003, 100) defines evolution as a “process, or cluster 
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of processes, which combines the generation of novelty and the 
selective retention of some of the novelties that are generated”. In the 
context of this evolutionary perspective, drawing on Nelson/Sampat 
(2001) and Nelson (2001), institutions can be regarded as “social 
technologies” where “physical technologies” are a kind of recipe 
which works regardless to the division of labour, whereas “social 
technologies “ are the specific mode of coordination once there is a 
division of labour. Social technologies involving “patterned human 
interaction” become institutions as soon as they are regarded by the 
relevant social group as standard and become attractive ways to get 
things done. In Nelson’s perspective this concept encompasses ways 
of structuring activity not only within particular organizations but 
also across organizational borders: They are not so much constraints 
on behaviour but rather an effective support as soon as human 
cooperation is needed (Nelson 2001, 24). 
Clusters accordingly can be interpreted as a specific social 
technology for the coordination of the knowledge intensive use of 
physical technologies – they are a form of productive pathway 
coordinating human action and combining different factors that are 
important for growth such as technical advance, physical capital, 
growth of human capital. Clusters as social technologies are an 
answer to the problems of achieving agreement and coordination 
between separate decision making units within a given spatial 
dimension. They combine different additional elements that are 
important for regional development and economic growth. 
 
3.2. Clusters as Coasian institutions 
 
Clusters then become specific institutions within the 
innovation system within which different levels exist. Within these 
systems there is a “pervasive interactivity and interconnectedness 
between elements of systems, pointing to the importance of linkages 
(or the effects of their absence) within innovation systems (and 
broader socio-economic systems)” (Bryant 2001, 369). These systems 
operate at several largely self-organizing hierarchical levels, which 
yet are never fully isolated. Clusters at the regional level are one 
specific perspective in this system. 
For an institutional perspective different levels of social 
analysis therefore have to be regarded. Williamson (2000, 596ff) 
dinstiguishes four of them: The top level – the level of social 
embeddedness – locates the norms, customs, mores, traditions 
which for institutional economists is regarded as given; the second 
refers to the institutional environment in the sense of formal rules 
such as constitutions, laws, property rights; at the third level 
questions of governance are solved whereas only the fourth level is 
the domaine of the usual questions of economics concerning the 
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problems of resource allocation and employment. It is the third level 
that offers itself for questions of cluster analysis in the form of 
specific governance structures which influence contractual and 
network relations. Alluding to the triplet of Commons (1932) of 
conflict, mutuality and order Williamson sees governance as “an 
effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual 
gains”. The prevailing governance structures hence reshape the 
incentives. 
We also have different forms of governance – markets, 
hybrids, integration. These hybrids offer themselves as a middle way 
between methodological holism and methodological individualism 
(Toboso 2001). According to Williamson the degree of specificity of 
investment influences the form of governance. It is also the effect of 
the new information technology that there is a strong presumption 
for network organization in the domain of hybrids (Williamson 
2000,72). 
In this line of reasoning clusters can be viewed as a specific 
“mode of governance”, as a form of Coasian institution, which tries to 
integrate the positive external effects of innovation, technological 
knowledge and development activities. The creation of such 
institutions may be put in question by high transaction costs. Yet, 
because of the specific asymmetric and tacit character of 
technological knowledge, these transactions have to be mediated by 
non-market methods. Primarily, these transactions are mediated 
through networks and other forms of arrangements between 
organizations and individuals, such as procedures which build trust 
and work to limit the damaging consequences of asymmetric 
information. Clusters can be regarded as economic clubs, which act 
as institutions for internalizing the problems of effective knowledge 
transmission. As such, networks are considered a substitute both for 
formal markets and for organizational integration. They therefore fall 
within the perimeter of non-market devices, which firms use to 
coordinate their activities with other firms and with other knowledge-
generating institutions. 
 
3.3. Between social networks and modes of governance 
 
Regarding clusters as a kind of Coasian institution begs the 
“second Coase” question (as raised by Granovetter 1994) – why do 
firms have costly cooperations with others and get embedded in 
social networks? 
Underlying this question are two contrasting models of 
institutions (Schmid/Maurer 2003). The sociological approach 
assumes that coordination mechanisms solely based on decentral 
decision making do not suffice to establish order needed for 
continued interaction but that a social process is needed which 
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guides this individual behaviour – human action does not need so 
much the assumption of rational behaviour but has to be regarded 
as guided by rules. Individual behaviour is therefore in need of 
institutions that lead to functioning social relationships. Exchange is 
only possible once the agents have agreed on institutions that allow 
such an exchange. The “exchange” specifically of knowledge then is 
only possible once there is a sufficient embeddedness and social 
capital that enables the firms to share their knowledge. Institutions 
here have “primordial” character. 
This differs from the economic approach where agents/firms 
make decisions that form institutions. Interpreted in terms of 
clusters firms decide to form clubs because they regard it as an 
efficient way to participate in and to contribute to the generation and 
diffusion of knowledge. Transaction-cost oriented economics – as 
outlined by Williamson (2000, 2002) - goes one step further. Social 
embeddedness is regarded as a higher level of institution and – once 
regarded as given for considerable amounts of time - influence the 
choice of contract between market and hierarchy. Once social 
embeddedness is given, and also adequate property rights, firms can 
decide about the forms of governance as a third level of institution. 
The resulting governance structure then reshapes incentives. Here 
these instituions are the result of deliberate choice. 
Taking these question-answer-positions for granted additional 
insights can be gained by “embedding” the organizational 
environment into the analysis of transaction problems (Ipsen 2002) 
and emphasizing the phenomenon of knowledge with all its specific 
characteristics of being tacit, largely public, often asymmetric and 
cumulative. Here the rationality of the decision is reduced because of 
the limited information regarding the knowledge to be received so the 
behaviour can not follow any more the usual economic rules of 
maximizing – deliberate choice is subject to bounded rationality. To 
this changed behaviour adds another element: Transactions – as 
emphasized by Helmstädter (2003) – are, once dealing with 
knowledge, no more the usual and simple transaction of exchange of 
goods, but contain strong elements of sharing. The usual rules of 
economic decision making underwent a double change: both the 
assumption concerning behaviour as well as the assumption 
concerning the environment under which decisions are taken - once 
knowledge is the object – obey other rules. 
This leads to the conclusion of the additional insights and 
implication (as asked by Williamson 1996) that can be gained by 
referring to the phenomenon of “social embeddedness” in analyzing 
transactional problems and choices of governance structures (Ipsen 
2003, 206f): 
• The organizational environment and the content of the 
transaction allows a deepened analysis of the choice of 
Economie et Institutions – n°6 et 7 – 1er et  2e semestres 2005 140 
governance - the more instable the environment, the less precise 
the character of the object to be “shared”, the less either market 
or hierarchy and hence the more hybrid forms of governance will 
be chosen. In dependence of moral hazard-risks and availability 
of social capital quite different types of hybrids may develop. This 
opens a research agenda for a deeper analysis of diverse cluster 
forms. 
• The transaction relation is more than a “make or buy” decision 
oriented towards cost-efficient production. The transactional 
approach is too narrow to account for longer term aspects such 
as the adaptation to changing market conditions and also for the 
development of a knowledge base within and between firms. 
Special organizational forms, i.e. institutions, are of decisive 
importance for the solution of such complex decision problems. 
• The isolated perspective of decisions concerning alternative 
governance forms therefore is not sufficient because it disregards 
the specific environmental situation and the content of the 
transactions; yet this applies also to the opposite perspective – 
behaviour is not completely determined by social relations, there 
are still decisions to be made. 
So there is the challenge to combine individual acts of choice 
and institutional frameworks. From the perspective of the firm it is 
essential to develop such institutional frameworks in order to 
support the problem of choice under uncertainty and to reduce 
complexity. 
 
3.4. Generating and selecting variety 
 
Evolutionary processes are marked by the continous 
appearance of various forms of novelty: adaption and discovery 
generate variety yet there is a need for collective interactions within 
and outside markets which work as selection mechanisms 
(Coriat/Dosi 2002, 96). 
From this evolutionary perspective  cluster activity is based 
on a different kind of logic, in which we have a paradigmatic change 
from an optimizing to an adaptive logic, which stresses the need for 
political intervention when the system fails. This adaptive logic is 
based on an Austrian, and in particular a Schumpeterian, 
evolutionary framework which interprets economic change in the 
following manner (Metcalfe 1995, 1998; Steiner 2002): 
Economic change is driven by the variety of economic results 
between competing and alternative possibilities ways of fulfilling 
needs. On the other hand, the variety of economic results depends 
on the variety of technical and organizational forms. Innovations 
introduce new varieties; yet imitation and competition consume 
variety, so that economic progress and economic change depend on 
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the balance of these two factors. Variety and diversity are therefore 
the main forces of economic progress in the context of a competition-
oriented market economy. Policy-making has to look not for 
optimality but for variety and diversity. One principal concern, 
therefore, is the difference in the behaviour of firms and the resulting 
variety of experiments. This implies a specific interpretation of firm 
behaviour which contrasts with traditional theory, in that it is the 
outlier firm, and not the representative firm, that is the typical 
element. There is a substantial diversity between firms – in size, in 
competence, in knowledge of technological options (Bryant 2001). 
Thus the attention of the evolutionary policy-maker shifts away from 
notions of efficiency toward notions of creativity, and patterns of 
adaptation to market stimuli and technological opportunity. The 
evolutionary policy-maker therefore adapts rather than optimizes, 
and his central concern is with the innovation system and the 
operation of the set of institutions within which technological 
capabilities are accumulated. Findings on individual cognition and 
communication indicate that there is not only the problem of 
quantitative underproduction of knowledge in markets but also a 
problem of qualitative underproduction of variety of knowledge 
(Bünstorf 2003, 92). The canonical policy problem is thus defined in 
terms of the dynamics of innovation, in a world characterized by 
immense micro-complexity. Since creativity and the generation of 
variety are central to this approach, the question of the wider 
institutional structure which supports the innovative activities of 
firms, is of central concern. This support has primarily to be 
coordinated through non-market-mediated interactions – the 
unbiased generation and diffusion of knowledge cannot be expected 
to come about spontaneously (Bünstorf 2003). 
A central fact about the modern process of innovation is that 
it is based on a division of labour, as clearly foreseen by Adam 
Smith. He early recognized what is now called the social nature of 
the innovation process. This division-of-labour induced social 
process produces efficiency gains from both specialization and 
professionalization, but also requires a framework to connect 
together the component contributions of the different agents. As far 
as knowledge and skills are concerned this aspect of connectivity, or 
technology transfer, cannot be effectively coordinated by 
conventional markets: we are in need of specific institutional 
arrangements. 
 
3.5. Knowledge sharing versus division of labour 
 
Yet – as has been outlined recently by Helmstädter (2003) – 
the aspect of connectivity transcends the usual problems of the 
“division of labour” – there are additional and non-trivial problems of 
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“knowledge sharing” so far not properly seized by New Institutional 
Economics. The main line of arguments runs as follows 
(Bödner/Helmstädter/Widmaier 1999, Helmstädter 2003): 
• The pure transaction cost approach misses fundamentally the 
essence of knowledge as an economic resource. “The new 
institutional economics is dealing with institutions that govern 
the interactions taking place under the division of labour, but 
leaving aside the division of knowledge activities that go with it” 
(Helmstädter 2003, 14). Once the subject of interaction between 
participating actors is knowledge the character of interaction 
changes – the institutional conditions for an efficient division of 
knowledge are different. 
• Social interaction processes – i.e. networks – have different 
subject matters of their interactions : Leaving aside the political 
network with the subject matter of political convincing, there are 
the networks of economic transactions and the one of knowledge 
sharing. The first belongs to the process of division of labour 
dealing with the exchange of goods and services, the second with 
knowledge. 
• The main differences reside in the form of interaction and in the 
impact of interaction: under the division of labour it is 
transaction of goods and services subject to the rules of 
competition and their redistribution with exclusivity, under 
knowledge sharing it is knowledge and skills subject to 
cooperation and the increase of knowledge for all (inclusivity). 
Also the next steps are different: in the first case it is separate 
elaboration, in the second internalization and 
recontextualization. 
• The most important “institutional” consequence is that 
“cooperation is the basic institution of the process of the division 
of knowledge” (Helmstädter 2003, 32). But the degree of 
cooperation depends again on the type of knowledge use: 
application has stronger competitive elements whereas the 
creation and the transfer are dominated by non-economic 
competition (status, acceptance) and mostly cooperation. The 
interest lies here in the institutions that make knowledge sharing 
efficient. 
 
These strands of evolutionary and institutional thinking in 
the context of knowledge creation and sharing emphasize that 
connectivity and the desired efficiency cannot be effectively 
coordinated by conventional markets and stress the importance of 
institutional arrangements for the generation of knowledge  and 
learning networks which are not all available in the markets. They 
also emphasize that the growth of knowledge depends on intended 
and unintended individual processing of experiences, i.e. ‘learning’, 
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while the interpretation, transfer and use of experiences is influenced 
by interaction between individuals and between organizations, i.e. 
‘organizational learning’.  
 
3.6. Learning organizations 
 
Learning if regarded as a social process of ongoing 
development embedded in a sociocultural (regional) context has 
become essentially a communicative process rather than a cognitive 
performance, requiring new thinking about the nature and forms of 
the transmission and dissemination of knowledge within a social and 
organizational context, such as the firm or a cluster (Cullen 1998). 
The concept of “organizational learning” – extended to clusters – is 
capable of highlighting some of these processes (Steiner/Hartmann 
1999, 2006). 
 
A learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, 
acquiring and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behaviour 
to reflect knowledge and insights (Garvin 1993). Organizational 
learning is the outcome of three overlapping spheres of activity - 
individual, team and system learning. All three kinds of learning take 
place simultaneously (Dixon 1995). Learning systems are therefore 
the precondition for the transformation from individual learning to 
organizational and even interorganizational learning (Staehle 1991). 
As a medium of communication and exchange that function 
independently of the individuals involved, such systems enable 
collective learning in and between organizations. Organizational 
learning takes place when the organization develops systemic 
processes to acquire, use and communicate organizational 
knowledge, as learning is conceived as something, that should 
deliberately be pursued by the organization and its members. 
(Argyris and Schon 1978, Nevis et al. 1995, Pedler et al. 1991, 
Stankiewicz 2001). Organizational learning may be recognized by the 
existence of learning systems that are independent of the individuals 
(Shrivastava 1983). Thus, “integrative capabilities” belong to the 
most important factors for clusters as prerequisites for regional 
development. This means that different fragments of knowledge, 
competencies, etc. have not only to be accessed but also integrated 
into specific configurations. The prevalence of ongoing learning 
processes between firms and within clusters indicates the 
importance of institutional arrangements for the generation of 
knowledge and learning networks. They serve to fulfil additional 
functions such as reducing uncertainty about the experimential 
knowledge of others and increasing the incentives for medium and 
long term investments in diffusion channels (Maskell and Malmberg, 
1999). Clusters can help to develop and adapt research, production, 
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distribution, and after-sales strategies to increase the capacity of 
participants to absorb new information and can contribute to raising 
the specificity of knowledge development, processing and diffusion 
within the cluster to strengthen incentives for the participants to 
concentrate their investments in the cluster and protect new 




"Whatever they are exactly, industrial districts are also a 
worldly success and a conceptual innovation" (Sabel, 2002, 107). 
Being aware that it is probably impossible to give a singular theory of 
clusters this paper argued that clusters support processes of 
knowledge generation, accumulation and diffusion – individuals and 
firms alone are from an economic point of view not capable of 
delivering sufficient amounts and varieties of knowledge. Therefore 
clusters as hybrid institutions are needed. Clusters can be regarded 
as a special form of governance providing a cognitive framework for 
transforming information into useful knowledge. It is the specific 
content, namely knowledge creation and diffusion, and not only the 
organisational form of networks that leads to clusters as specific 
institutions. At the same time they restrict and protect – more or less 
efficiently – this knowledge for cluster members generating incentives 
of belonging to the club. Yet the specific balance of deliberate choice 
and social embeddedness opens the room for quite different 
organizational forms. 
As an evolutionary institution clusters are also exemplars of 
the relationship between economic organization and economic 
development (Loasby 1998). One important aspect of this perspective 
is that institutions like clusters are not automatically there but that 
they are the result of an evolving process shaped by policy activities 
and entrepreneurial behaviour responding to new challenges. This 
implies a changing character of institutions in support of knowledge 
creation and sharing – clusters as a form of “social technology” are 
co-evolving with new physical technologies and are therefore in a 
constant need to change themselves. Institutions are themselves 
shaped by economic behaviour and hence subject to change. Since 
there is definitely room for agency there is ongoing interaction 
between the agents and the clusters which is a driving force for the 
adaptation of clusters. So there is in-built endogenity in the 
development of clusters: their institutional forms are exogenous in 
the short-run (so setting the framework for economic relationships 
and development), but become themselves endogenous over the 
longer run. The changing character of clusters – in forms of 
organisation, in the kind and mechanism of knowledge sharing, in 
their geographical reach – becomes a challenge for further research. 
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Cluster theorizing has to avoid universalism – there is not 
only strong diversity between clusters but also within. Clusters are 
highly differentiated across sectors, regions and countries. There is 
also no single model of knowledge transmission, also not within 
clusters. As already foreseen by Marshall variety exists also within 
clusters. So we still are in need of detailed studies on how knowledge 
is transferred and to what extent and how knowledge spills over – 
there is much unobserved heterogeneity. Recent case studies of 
knowledge exchange within clusters (Giuliani 2005, Guiliani/Bell 
2005, Steiner/Ploder 2005, Steiner/Hartmann  2006)  support the 
argument that knowledge transfer is by no means automatic, that 
proximity per se is not sufficient to generate learning between firms, 
that the forms of organized learning differs remarkably between 
clusters, that the diffusion of knowledge within clusters is highly 
selective and strongly dependent of the position of firms within 
networks and their absorptive capacity. This extends to questions of 
limits of the collectivity of learning and how to overcome it, of a 
necessary balance between internal coherence and external linkages, 
to the potentials and preconditions of knowledge exchange between 
clusters on a larger geographical (Europeanwide?) scale. 
It would be an exaggeration therefore to report that the 
cluster debate is dead.  
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